I. Introduction
Fostering competition law and policy ain't easy in Asia, for good reasons. To begin with, some Asian competition laws don't even have the right titles. Positive competition laws in Asia often are labeled as some kind of "fair trade" laws, and their enforcement agencies are called some kind of "fair trade" commissions. As argued later herein, fairness could mean many things and anything but efficiency, the dominant goal of antitrust laws. This, I argue, is how Asian competition laws got into trouble in the first place. 1 Second, statutory competition laws, albeit supposedly focusing on monopoly and cartel regulation, often contain an element of unfair competition law. As such, they are "unitary" competition laws wherein rules prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and rules against unfair competition are commingled. Worse yet, the legislative goals of these two subparts of the unitary code are often shared and recited in the same legislative purpose clause, resulting in further confusions in law enforcement activities.
Third, competition laws in Asia were more often superimposed than home grown.
Failure to truly internalize the need to foster market competition allows positive competition laws in Asia to drift more toward non-efficiency goals.
Fourth, these competition laws do not command any higher order of priority, respect or importance among the full panoply of municipal economic laws. Nor do fair trade commissions or similar competition authorities in Asia command a strong * Professor, Soochow University Law School and National Taiwan University Management School and, concurrently, Executive Vice President and Chief Strategies Officer, China Development Financial Holdings Corporation, Taipei, Taiwan. The views expressed in this article are those of the author's alone and should not be attributed to any organizations with which he is affiliated. Comments should be sent to lawrenceliu@cdibh.com. 1 Interestingly, the Asian jurisdictions that have an elaborate set of competition laws are all Civil Law countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and China. There has been talk but no action in Hong Kong for years about enacting a comprehensive competition law, mainly to deal with anticompetitive conduct in the service sector. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any significant exploration as to why the Japanese antimonopoly law came to be titled as some kind of a fair trade law.
This inquiry is shadowed by the law's short title as an antimonopoly law. However, section 1 (legislative purpose) of this law clearly mentions terms and phrases like "unfair business practices" and "promote free and fair competition". Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that this legislation governs two completely different and equally important aspects of competition law: free competition and fair competition.
In antitrust parlance, unreasonable restraints of trade can constitute unfair business practice. More important, unfair competition means a kind of business tort: resorting to misappropriation or misinformation to gain a competitive edge.
But this is exactly where Asian competition laws got mixed up. Free competition and fair competition are two vastly different things. The former focuses on efficiency (discussed more later), while the latter rightfully focuses on fairness.
But section 2(9) of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law blends them together under the definition of "unfair business practices". These practices include a hodgepodge of wrongful conduct like undue discrimination, dealing at undue prices, undue inducement or coercion of customers of a competitor, dealing with others in a way unreasonably restricting the business activities of others, dealing with others through unwarranted use of bargaining position, and undue interference with a transaction or undue inducement for an insider to act against his company.
A deceptively simplistic and elegant prohibition then follows in section 19 of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law: no entrepreneur shall employ unfair business practices.
Some of the defined conduct contained in this prohibition would fall within the traditional antitrust domains where efficiency goals reign. Some are business torts that should be dealt with through unfair competition law. And yet some others in fact would be viewed as pretty legal, albeit aggressive, methods of competition in the West. No matter. The good, the bad and the ugly are all captured by one single Japanese rubric of "unfair business practices" and condemned as such. 
C. Hybrid Competition Law
Asian competition law seems a hybrid of antitrust rules and unfair competition rules blended together. In the statutory competition laws of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia, the legislative purpose clause sets forth the goals of these laws. They make references to "free and fair competition" indiscriminately. And this is intriguing for pedagogical purposes, as "free competition law" and "fair competition law" are two related but distinctive branches of competition law. "Free competition law" deals with freedom of consumer choices and protects freedom from unreasonable restraints of trade. It is concerned with efficiency-related goals. As a result, "free competition law" usually is interested in ensuring that there is not too little competition left in the market to discipline firms. On the other hand, "fair competition law" deals with misappropriation or misinformation designed to gain an unfair competitive advantage. As such, "fair competition law" is rightly concerned with fairness issues. It therefore seeks to deal with too much competition.
In more developed competition law jurisdictions like Germany, European Union and America, competition law is binary, with separate codes or different bodies of case law addressing antitrust rules and unfair competition rules. In Asia, there is some level of binary development. In at least Japan and Korea, in addition to Legal rules should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on human welfare, which is to say, on the well-being of individuals in society. In particular, this means that ideas of fairness should … receive no independent weight in the evaluation of legal rules….
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That difficulty with fairness-based analysis will be seen in clearest terms in a number of paradigmatic situations … that promoting notions of fairness would make everyone worse off. (emphasis added). Unfairness from the view-point of equality or disparity did not bother the policy maker at the Government or the Diet. (emphasis added).
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Commissioner Ariga apparently confused efficiency loss with unfairness.
Alternatively, she was more interested in expressing her displeasure with market restraints in terms of natural justice and fairness. Laudable as these comments may be, they are not exactly an appropriate antitrust analysis. They are not even necessary to the conclusions to be drawn. As antitrust economics (at least in the United State) had progressed by that time, the theory of monopoly suggests that monopolies have two evils. First, it transfers wealth from consumers to producers.
Second and more important, they force consumers to substitute away into more costly and less efficient goods so as to obtain the same level of utility, thereby creating a social deadweight loss. -10-such restraints are void as against public policy. However, the vagueness and breadth of "public interest" also can be a Pandora's box and opens the door for multiple and competing goals that supposedly inform but actually confuse municipal competition laws. Unfortunately for Asian competition law, the Pandora's box was opened back in 1947, when regulators and the public in Japan developed a fairness-based (whatever fairness meant) perception of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law. The slight permutations in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and China that followed down this path, as we now know, was history.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has made keen observations about the Japanese lock on fairness in enforcing its competition law.
The OECD found that,
[I]n Japan's traditional approach to market competition, fair treatment has been as important as free processes. In all settings, the term "competition" is typically accompanied by both "free" and "fair". The competition agency has considered fair competition to be as indispensable as free competition.
Widespread public concern to protect the value of fairness thus supports this aspect of the competition agency's actions. The statutory definition of "competition" concentrates on process and immediate effects on particular businesses. "Competition," for most purposes, is a state in which firms can sell similar goods or services to the same consumers, or get similar products form the same supplier, "without undertaking any significant change in their business facilities or kinds of business activities." Such a definition would encourage assessing competition in terms of how conduct diverges from 'business as usual rather than in terms of economic concepts such excess profits, allocative efficiency, or innovation.
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The focus of this astute observation of Japanese competition law enforcement philosophy, I think, is legal culture and social norms. The "widespread public concern to protect the value of fairness" cited by the OECD forces the JFTC to follow the quirky kind of enforcement philosophy mentioned above. In Japan, despite the statutory instruction for the competition law to promote economic growth, competition and growth were treated as inconsistent goals forcing a trade-off. 19 As found by the OECD, In Japan, much of its substantive competition law is unfair competition rules.
However, as found by the OECD, "'free' is conjoined with "fair." All of the rules (which focus on premium offers, labeling, wholesale-retail contract terms, newspaper pricing, textbook sales practices, competition and commercial terms in ocean shipping, and excessive lotteries) are, literally, about protecting competitors." 22 These unfair business practice rules present a "regulatory", that is, bureaucratic approach, to competition policy, and can be applied without the need to show economic or competitive harm in the cases involved, thereby diverging from sound economic policy.
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This kind of philosophy is a stark contrast with the more legalistic regulatory culture that guides, for example, American competition law enforcement.
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Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, rules about practice in a specific industry require industry consultation before their adoption. 25 As a result, one can infer that this consultative process both facilitates industry co-ordination and requires competition. As the OECD concludes, this process "reinforces the implication that the industry -specific rules are aimed first at achieving fairness among businesses, and second at preserving the competitive process for the benefit of the larger public."
The OECD also believes the JFTC enjoys the strongest, widest support in the business community when they enforce this part of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law, causing the JFTC to use these rules to consolidate "its legitimacy and public image."
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So much attention has been given to "fairness" among competitors in Japan that 20 -13-the whole area of anti-cartel rules became a minefield, and no clear rules emerged.
In Japan, it can seem "natural to set a standard of fairness based on common industry practice." 27 Government guidance of industry has been customary and viewed as a legitimate exercise of administrative power. Therefore, a chronic and pervasive competition policy problem in Japan has been government sponsorship or toleration of horizontal industry co-ordination, either by promoting and defending explicit cartels and market divisions, or by less direct means, from using trade associations as surrogates or tools for governmental regulation, to encouraging tact co-ordination in oligopolistic industries, to administrative guidance that confirms and polices non-competitive consensus.
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The fairness-based competition policy in Japan also influenced the composition and work of the JFTC. To be sure, when fairness instead of efficiency is the dominant competition policy goal in any jurisdiction, it is not easy to develop an apolitical and professional competition policy institution. Supposedly independent, the JFTC and the commissioners are "not completely outside the political and government process." 29 The OECD found that:
The choice of personnel shows that the FTC maintains long-term ties to the rest of the government. The commissioners have traditionally been former officials from the Ministry of Finance (which was almost always the source of the Chairman), the central, MITI, and the Ministry of Justice, with one position reserved for a senior career FTC official. These ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, also supplied many of the senior staff, which has been the principal source of policy and enforcement initiative. Because of ties such as these, some observers believe that the FTC has not always been as independent in fact as it could be in principle.
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Of course, there has been some important and benign change in the selection of commissioners in last several years. However, the JFTC has faced a formidable challenge in enforcing the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. The OECD quoted relatively a recent Japanese/British academic study and found the JFTC as: 'a unique and vulnerable agency administering deeply unpopular laws based on a widely rejected model of market competition', playing an 'ambiguous and difficult' role, with a 'huge gap' between its theoretical powers and its actual practice. The gap is closing, but 'the renaissance of competition policy in Japan is recent, partial, and far from fully secured.
B. Competition Law Experience in Korea
Korea has a similar experience as Japan in that fairness also informed and confused the enforcement of the Korean competition law. Much like Japan, Korea's experience is the result of its development strategy. As found by the OECD, such development strategy resulted in "a dual economy, divided between highly competitive, export-oriented manufacturing and a much less dynamic, domestic demand-oriented sector. Indeed, the productivity gap between the manfuctruring and service sectors in Korea is the largest in the OECD area. The KFTC designates the firms that are subject to special regulation because of their size, enforces rules governing the structure of holding companies, limits total shareholdings outside a designated group and cross-holdings within it, 31 Id, at p. 9, and citing K. What is even more remarkable is that when one compares the ratio of economists to lawyers, Korea has the best ratio (two to one) among all competition law regimes in the world. 41 One fair speculation is that with more economists on its staff in absolute and relative terms, the KFTC should move away from the fairness-based competition law enforcement, and gravitate gradually to the efficiency-based competition law model.
C. Competition Law Experience in Taiwan
Taiwan's Fair Trade Law was heavily influenced by the Japanese Antimonopoly has become a quick study of these rules and never hesitates to use them to assert its right.
Second, China's vast domestic market is becoming larger and deeper by the day.
This makes enforcement of its competition law ever more important. When China enacts its Antimonopoly Law, that legislation will be applicable to the largest population as well as the fastest growing economy in the world. The Chinese experience could take the development of Asian competition law to a completely new 42 See Lawrence Liu, supra, at p. __. The most important provision in the draft Antimonopoly Law will be rules against administrative monopolies.
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Likewise, European law prohibits state aid measures preventing the formation of a single market. In the United States, the famous "state action doctrine" deals with the same issues, albeit on a much smaller scale because there is much less government involvement in the American economy.
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In this context, there may be more justification in treating the Antimonopoly Law as some sort of fair competition law, because it is unfair for some government-linked competitors to resort to government measures so as to forestall competition.
Analogy to the KFTC's regulation of chaebol quickly comes to mind, although the task could be more daunting in China. KFTC only has to deal with private monopolies, albeit well politically connected ones. operating in the marketplace.
At one point, a version of the draft Antimonopoly Law provides for an independent commission, that is, some sort of fair trade commission, to the enforcement agency. In the current draft, there is no such proposal. One safe speculation is that politics will decide the shape and power of the enforcement agency.
Therefore, whether a strong antitrust enforcer will emerge remains to be seen.
Politics will likely determine the role of competition law among the whole set of economic policies pursued by the Chinese government. As experience from other Asian competition law has shown, fairness-based principles can actually lead to industrial policy. Clearly, China has an industrial policy through which it wishes to create national champions that would be globally competitive. China believes strongly in this policy and thinks it is only fair for China to catch up with the world in this way. In recent years, China's has been using its domestic market to set standards for technologies. Examples are Wi-Fi encryption, RFID (radio frequency Income redistribution conceptually is closer to fairness than other goals. In the United States, there is a strong resistance for the government to get involved in arbitrating the proper allocation of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Also, gigantic producers which earn large profits may be a listed company whose shares are widely held by many small investors, while some consumers may command formidable wealth. Also, argues the neo-classical economist, the government can achieve income redistribution through better means, such as direct subsidies and taxation. The aims of the European Community's competition policy are economic, political and social. The policy is concerned not only with promoting efficient production but also achieving the aims of the European treaties: establishing a common market, approximating economic policies, promoting harmonious growth, raising living standards, bringing Member States closer together, etc.
To this must be added the need to safeguard a pluralistic democracy, which could not survive a strong concentration of economic power. If competition policy is to reach these various goals, decisions must be made in a pragmatic fashion, bearing in mind the context in which they are to be made: the realization of the internal market, the globalization of markets, economic crisis, technological development, the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, etc.
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A well recognized American expert on European law has also concluded that EU competition law "seeks to preserve opportunities for small and middle-sized business, though it is also motivated by concerns for efficient business and for consumers'
interest." 58 Clearly, the litany of "noncore" antitrust goals reflect a strong European bent in favor of some fairness-based thinking.
Importantly, these thoughts and, in particular, the abuse of dominant market position rule that stands out as a distinguishing feature of European competition law, 
